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Abstract: In this complex and highly interconnected world, one government rarely possesses full 
capability in any given policy area. It is therefore vital to understand how governments can work 
together to achieve collective goals. This paper examines how horizontal cooperation between 
local governments emerges in metropolitan regions. It tests a theoretical framework that unites 
the two dominant, but so far isolated, approaches to regional governance and cooperation in four 
cases: the Toronto and Waterloo city-regions in Canada, and the Frankfurt and Rhein-Neckar 
regions in Germany. Findings demonstrate the inconsistency of the systemic and intervening 
factors that anchor the two dominant approaches and propose an alternative approach – civic 
capital – to explain observed patterns of cooperation. Finally, the paper reflects on the theoretical 
and policy implications of these findings for research in comparative politics and regional 
governance. 
Keywords: regional governance, intermunicipal cooperation, civic capital, regional development, 
regional marketing. 1 
 
In this complex and highly interconnected world, one government rarely possesses full capability 
in any given policy area. Nowhere is this more of a challenge than for local governments. They 
are subject to the outcomes of policies formulated by senior levels of government, to global 
forces, and their fortunes and opportunities are affected by decisions and actions of neighboring 
municipalities over which they have little control. One option open to municipalities in 
metropolitan regions
i facing these realities is to engage in interlocal cooperation. Coordinating 
and cooperating with neighboring local governments can mitigate interjurisdictional spillovers 
and help create economies of scale (Feoick, 2007). Establishing a vision and policies at the 
metropolitan level can increase competitiveness relative to other metropolitan jurisdictions 
(Pierce, 1993) and foster a critical mass of political capital with which to influence policy at 
senior levels of government. One of the advantages of a cooperative approach is that it can be as 
informal or institutionalized as the partners wish and is suited to a wide variety of issue areas 
(see Nelles, 2009a). While intermunicipal cooperation is not appropriate to every situation it is 
an attractive alternative to regional reform and is frequently adopted in city-regions as a 
mechanism of policy coordination in the context of governmental fragmentation (Andrew, 2009; 
Hulst and van Montfort, 2007). As a result the questions of how intermunicipal partnerships 
emerge and which conditions encourage or hinder cooperation in city-regions are of increasing 
interest to scholars and policymakers alike. 
This paper investigates not only the factors that affect the evolution of intermunicipal 
relationships, but also the strength of the resulting partnerships. In sum, it considers the extent to 
which actors within a regional partnership are indeed “all for one”. It investigates these core 
questions through a qualitative comparative analysis of regional marketing alliances in four city-
regions in two countries - the Toronto and Waterloo regions in Canada, and Frankfurt Rhein-2 
 
Main and the Rhein Neckar regions in Germany. These cases are analyzed using a unique 
theoretical framework that combines elements of governance and interjurisdictional agreement 
(IJA) approaches, the two dominant literatures that treat cooperative dynamics in metropolitan 
regions. The results of the comparative analysis show that the systemic and intervening variables 
considered by the governance and IJA approaches have different effects on, and can act in 
different directions (positive or negative) relative to the intensity of cooperative relationships 
across cases. This suggests that while these approaches can provide valuable insights into how 
and why cooperation emerges in specific cases, they are not generalizable.  
As an alternative explanation for the patterns observed in these cases this paper introduces the 
concept of civic capital. This approach contends that the greater the presence of civic networks at 
the regional scale the more likely that cooperation between municipal governments will emerge 
and become institutionalized. This study and its findings make both theoretical and empirical 
contributions to the field of comparative politics. One aim of this paper is to address the gap 
Pierre (2005) noted in the lack of comparative research in the areas of urban and regional 
governance by employing a wide range of qualitative comparative techniques in theory building 
and analysis. Additionally, this theoretical framework unites two previously isolated approaches 
and highlights important lessons for  regional governance in practice, but it also contributes to 
scholarship on intergovernmental and interorganizational relations more broadly by confirming 
the importance of the role of networks in establishing partnerships. The conclusion reflects 
further on the theoretical and policy implications of the findings of this paper. The following 
section outlines the theoretical framework and summarizes the methodological approach before 
applying them in the analysis of the four case studies. The concept of civic captial is then 3 
 
introduced in an attempt to account for observed patterns the systemic and intervening elements 
of the combined theoretical framework are unable to explain. 
Regional Governance and Interjurisdictional Negotiations: Uniting Two Approaches 
The issues raised by the absence of formal and functionally inclusive city-region government to 
coordinate action beyond the boundaries of municipal authorities has been considered in the 
context of a wide range of major metropolitan problems (see, for example, Altschuler et al. 1999; 
Barnes and Ledebur, 1998;  Frug and Barron, 2008; Pastor et al. 2000; Swanstrom, 2001). City-
regional governance can be structured in numerous ways, but cooperation of some form between 
local political authorities is at the heart of every regionally-developed governance arrangement. 
Consequently, any analysis of governance capacity at the city-region scale requires an 
understanding of the dynamics of intermunicipal collaborative relationships and their 
commitment to regional collective action. Cooperation is here defined as the "voluntary 
association of governmental and non-governmental organizations in a defined geographic area 
for the purpose of controlling or regulating behaviour within and performing functions or 
providing services for the overall territory"  (Norris, 2001, 535). Given the importance of the 
concept of cooperation to regional governance arguments it is puzzling that only very few studies 
in this area engage with the literature and theoretical approaches that deal with the dynamics of 
interjurisdictional contracting and partnership. 
Contemporary literature on interjurisdictional cooperation is a variant of the rational choice 
approach and concentrates largely on the North American context (see Feoick, 2007; Feiock, 
2004; Oakerson; Post, 2004; 2004; Steinacker, 2004). This perspective focuses on the factors that 
shape the actions of individual decision makers and has tended to concentrate on single case 
studies of bilateral intermunicipal partnerships for service delivery. In attempting to understand 4 
 
cooperative outcomes they concentrate on the factors that affect the actions of decision makers 
faced with the opportunity or desire to engage in intermunicipal cooperation. As a result they 
emphasize transaction costs as barriers to cooperation (Andrew, 2009; Hawkins, 2009; Schneider 
and Teske, 1992), which is inherently tied to the charateristics of the collective good that 
partnership will provide. The variables typically considered by these approaches relate to the 
costs and benefits of cooperation. Transaction costs encompass information and coordination 
costs, negotiation and division costs (including potential for joint benefits), enforcement and 
monitoring costs, and agency or political costs  (Feoick, 2007). Other variables that affect 
decisions to enter into cooperative relationships, drawing on Olson (1965) include the presence 
or absence of coercion or selective incentives, and the number of actors involved in the 
partnership. Asymmetry of power between actors and asset specificity are also frequently 
considered in these approaches (Post, 2004; Steinacker, 2004).  
The regional governance literature, by contrast, centers predominantly on the forms and politics 
of regional partnerships in Europe. This scholarship is generally more comparative and focuses 
on broader governance arrangements across city-regions (Hulst and van Montfort, 2007) often in 
the context of analyzing the evolution of specific projects  (see Otgaar et al. 2008 and Salet and 
Gualini, 2007), or the impact of institutional environments  (Frug, 1999;  Frug and Barron, 2008; 
Lambregts et al. 2008). Some of the factors cited by this literature include the power and 
autonomy of political leaders, availability and distribution of local resources and financial 
autonomy (Hulst and van Montfort, 2007; Lefevre, 2004; Norris, 2001), the influence of political 
parties (Fedele and Moini, 2007), preexisting governance structures (Fürst, 2006; Hulst and van 
Montfort, 2007), and the influence of legislation made by higher levels of government, 
particularly in the EU context (Otgaar et al. 2008).  5 
 
These two dominant streams of literature are broadly concerned with understanding the 
processes and dynamics of horizontal relationships between local governments yet rarely engage 
with one another. In some cases they even use similar variables – for instance, the influence of 
the distribution and number of actors involved in partnerships is considered by both approaches – 
but their methods and analysis rarely overlap. This may be a matter of perspective. Governance 
approaches focus largely on institutional influences where rational choice perspectives tend to 
focus on factors related to the characteristics of an issue (such as the opportunity cost of 
investment, or asset specificity). Because of this conceptual difference these two approaches 
have the potential to contribute to and complement one another. Christopherson (2010) makes a 
similar point about the gulf between European and American approaches to local and regional 
economic development literature. This paper highlights the commonalities between the two 
dominant approaches to intermunicipal policy coordination and reimagines a theoretical 
framework that combines elements of each in order to capture the best of both analytical worlds. 6 
 
Table 1: Theoretical framework variables, definitions and selected components 7 
 
This theoretical framework is outlined in Table 1. In the table each framework variable is defined 
and examples of the components drawn from the two literature and their attributions are listed 
for each one. In this interpretation a wide range of influences are (re)classified into two broader 
groups of variables. Systemic variables shape the environment in which decision-makers operate. 
These are factors consist principally of the broader institutions that form the rules of the game. 
While these can certainly change over time they are distinctive from the intervening variable 
class to the extent that they are relatively predictable and stable over time. Intervening variables, 
by contrast, are episodic in nature and difficult to foresee. These also shape the decision-making 
environment of local actors often by altering the stakes of the game and therefore shifting 
incentives. It is interesting to note that even at this level of theoretical abstraction the direction of 
influence – positive or negative – on cooperation cannot necessarily be predicted. In other words, 
for almost all of the framework variables it is possible to imagine positive or negative outcomes.  
The example of institutional autonomy illustrates this ambiguity. The more access to 
revenue sources or funding tools the more likely a municipality may be willing to commit to 
cooperation. In this case, the ability to raise or repurpose funds may give them the flexibility and 
inclination to devote resources to a collective rather than competitive venture. However, 
municipalities with greater access to resources may also face lower incentives to collaborate. 
Conceivably, if they have the revenue generating capacity to engage in collaboration they have 
the potential to generate the resources necessary to go it alone and maintain autonomy over 
decision-making in the target policy area. What kind of effect, if any, this variable has on 
cooperation will depend on other contextual factors, including the effect of other framework 
variables. There can be no doubt that understanding the influence of systemic and intervening 
factors is essential to understanding the emergence and character of partnerships in city-regions. 8 
 
But even at the outset the difficulty of developing a hypothesis about cooperative dynamics in a 
given case from this theoretical framework alone is evident. This paper uses the four empirical 
cases to test this hypothesis and to explore an alternative approach in the concept of civic capital. 
All for One (Sometimes): Empirical Findings 
Regional marketing partnerships are one of the most common forms of intermunicipal 
cooperation. The capital costs of setting up and maintaining these types of partnerships are 
relatively low and the benefit of regional collaboration in this area is fairly easy for local actors 
to accept (see Nunn and Rosentraub, 1997). Additionally, while participation requires 
cooperation to attract investment to and to promote the region, these types of associations do not 
preclude competitive behaviour between actors once investors have decided to locate there. In 
short, regional marketing as an issue area presents relatively low barriers to cooperation. The 
broader empirical project from which these cases are drawn includes cases with much higher 
issue-related barriers to cooperation such as regional cultural policy and regional transportation, 
but these are omitted in this analysis due to space constraints (see Nelles, 2009a; Nelles, 2009b; 
Nelles, 2010).  
The four city- regions in two different countries were selected for variation in their institutional 
contexts and similarity in size and economic composition to enable cross-national comparison. 
The two large city-regions – Toronto and Frankfurt – have regional populations of over 3.5 
million and similar economic functions as central nodes of trade, manufacturing, and 
international finance within their countries. The smaller regions – the Rhein-Neckar and 
Waterloo regions – are both manufacturing and knowledge hubs with comparable regional 
geographies in terms of the polycentric distribution of the core municipalities and of their 9 
 
economic functions relative to the two larger city-regions in this study. These cases, therefore, 
allow for both internal and cross-national controls. 
In each case the character and evolution of the regional marketing partnerships was analyzed 
using the theoretical framework described above. The character and strength of cooperation was 
assessed using a combination of scope of participation and institutionalization measures 
alongside practical evidence of commitment to the partnership.
ii There is considerable variation 
between cases in the strength of cooperative relationships, in the extent to which the partners are 
genuinely “all for one”.   
Cooperation in practice 
The Greater Toronto Marketing Alliance (GTMA) is one of the weakest partnerships in this 
sample. It was established in 1997 as a public-private partnership between 29 municipalities and 
regional governments in the Toronto region. The GTMA was conceived to promote the Greater 
Toronto Area (GTA) internationally and to act as a central regional portal for site selection 
information, and advice on provincial and Canadian regulation, and to help establish 
international partnerships. While participation is broad and institutionalization is relatively 
strong, attitudes about the effectiveness of the partnership are strikingly negative. As one 
observer remarked: “The GTMA has the right mandate, but people question what it is 
delivering” (confidential interview, August 2007). Another stated that “no one in Toronto 
thought that the GTMA would make a difference. It‟s about getting along and maintaining 
appearances” (confidential interview, September 2007). These cynical attitudes towards the 
partnership are echoed in the actions of member municipalities. Despite supporting the GTMA 
financially several mayors and delegations from member municipalities have participated in solo 
trade missions over the past two years, and GTMA functions are consistently duplicated at the 10 
 
local level (Spears, 2008). Local actors acknowledge the importance of cooperation in the area of 
regional marketing but to the degree that the partnership, as structured, is not effectively serving 
this need parochial behaviors may be reasserting themselves. 
The marketing partnership in Frankfurt is even weaker than the GTMA due to lower 
participation, weaker institutionalization, and similarly cynical attitudes about its effectiveness. 
FrankfurtRheinMain GmbH “International Marketing of the Region” (FRM GmbH) was founded 
in March 2005 to fulfill a mandate of the state legislation requiring cooperation across the 
planning region in marketing, culture and several other areas. It developed into a partnership 
between 22 towns, districts, and communities within, and extending slightly beyond the 
boundaries of the central core of the city-region. As in the Toronto case the actions of partner 
municipalities, however, indicate a relatively weak cooperative commitment to the association. 
Many of the municipal actors still maintain their own economic development and marketing 
offices. Consequently, there is still a degree of competitiveness between municipalities within 
the region as to where potential leads generated by the regional association should be situated. 
The two cases stand in marked contrast to the experience of the Waterloo and Rhein-Neckar 
regions. Waterloo‟s regional marketing association – Canada‟s Technology Triangle Inc. (CTT 
Inc.) – enjoys broad participation, is strongly institutionalized, and is and widely regarded as one 
of the keystone organizations of the region. It was founded in 1987 by the economic 
development officials of the cities of Kitchener, Waterloo, Cambridge and neighbouring Guelph 
to coordinate marketing activities. While actors in the region sometimes question the 
effectiveness of CTT Inc. as a marketing association, there is a widespread recognition and 
support for its role as a leader in regional development efforts. As one official noted: “[CTT Inc.] 11 
 
is the economic development arm that represents all of us when they‟re looking to bring 
companies in and when they get here the individual municipality works with the businesses in 
their own area is how we divvy it up, but there‟s certainly is a lot of cooperation between the 
municipalities, certainly on the economic development front.  Because the reality is our 
economies are completely intertwined” (confidential interview, March 2009). There is rarely any 
duplication of international promotion efforts at the local level. 
There is a similar level of support for the regional marketing association in the Rhein-Neckar 
region. The current regional marketing association, the Metropolregion Rhein-Neckar GmbH 
(MRN GmbH), was founded in 2006 and is the legal successor of a previous partnership 
established in 2000. The MRN GmbH significantly expanded both the membership and the 
mandate of the previous partnership. In addition to being the international marketing and 
branding association for the region, it has also been described as the spokes-organization for the 
Metropolregion Rhein-Neckar (confidential interview, February 2007) and as a key player in the 
governance structure that deals with regional planning and development. The association itself is 
broadly supported by its membership and is the most highly institutionalized of all four cases. 
The following statement sums up how local development officials see the partnership: “If there 
are several appropriate sites in different cities then there is competition, sure. But normally 
everyone understands that even if one city loses, the region always wins” (confidential interview, 
translated from German, January 2007). 
These cases illustrate the very different experiences that city-regions can have in establishing and 
sustaining regional cooperation. Marketing partnerships were weakest in the two largest regions, 
and markedly stronger in the smaller ones. The most obvious conclusion is that differences in 12 
 
cooperative intensities are related to differences in city-region sizes and the number of actors 
involved in the partnerships. True enough, Frankfurt and Toronto are the largest city-regions by 
population. However, they are not both the largest by number of actors. Per Olson (1965) smaller 
groups are more likely than larger ones to spontaneously cooperate. By extension, regional 
cooperation as a form of collective action is ceteris paribus more likely to occur in regions with 
fewer actors. However, the results of this analysis are not consistent with that position. Both 
German city-regions dwarf the Canadian ones in terms of number of governments within the 
city-region: Frankfurt comprises 445 and Rhein-Neckar has 282 communities, municipalities and 
counties. Toronto and Waterloo, by contrast, count 29 and 8 cities and communities, 
respectively. By this logic, cooperation should be much easier to achieve in Canada. Clearly, 
there are other factors at play. 
Uncovering cooperative influences 
As expected, the elements of the theoretical framework have variable influences on cooperation 
in each case. Factors that have positive influences in one case have negative influences in others. 
Some have no impact at all. The influence and direction of impact of each variable is 
summarized in Table 2 where a (-) indicates a barrier to cooperative behavior and a (+) indicates 
a positive impact. Zeros symbolize no or negligible impact and in some cases, such as party 
politics where there are no political parties at the local level in the Canadian cases, variables are 
not applicable (n.a.). What this table demonstrates most effectively is the striking lack of 
patterns. Cases in which cooperation was easier to establish share little in common, such that it is 
impossible to pick out which factors contributed most significantly to their cooperative „success‟. 
Similarly, no one variable or set of variables seems to account for the weakness of cooperation in 
the two larger regions. In the analysis that follows it is clear that each of the factors with an 13 
 
impact on cooperation is fundamental to comprehending cooperative dynamics between local 
governments in these regions. As such, the theoretical framework and the literatures that it was 
derived from make a vital contribution to the study of cooperation and regional governance. 
These findings also suggest that there may be another approach better able to account for the 
observed differences between cases.  
Variables/Region  Toronto  Frankfurt  Waterloo  Rhein-Neckar 
Executive 
Autonomy  -  -/+  0  + 
Institutional 
Autonomy  -  -  -  0 
Party Politics  n.a.  0  n.a.  0 
Power Asymmetry  -  -  -  0 
Previous 
Structures  +  -  n.a.  + 
Intervention  -  +  n.a.  n.a. 
Shocks  +  0  0  0 
 
(-) negative influence on cooperation; (+) positive influence on cooperation; (0) no influence on 
cooperation; (n.a.) not applicable 
Table 2: The influence of framework variables on cooperation in regional marketing alliances by 
region 
 
 In the Toronto case only the influence of previous structures of governance and of external 
shocks positively affected the emergence of intermunicipal cooperation. Previously established 
informal and weakly institutionalized intermunicipal partnerships had an impact on the 
development of the GTMA. The Greater Toronto Area Economic Development Partnership 
(GTA-EDP) is an institutionalized but informal meeting of economic development directors and 14 
 
officials from around the GTA and is a cooperative structure forged as a response to external 
shocks. As one observer noted: “one of the key driving forces behind the GTA-EDP was the 
realization that the region was facing global competition from regions that were never a factor 
before. This meant we needed to work harder and work together” (confidential interview, July 
2007). It began in the early 1990s as an unofficial grouping of like-minded officials designed to 
facilitate information exchange between area municipalities. This partnership remains informal, 
meeting only sporadically since the late 1990s. The Greater Toronto Mayors and Chairs 
Committee (GTA-MCC) was established in 1992 as an initiative of Mississauga mayor Hazel 
McCallion. This group brought together 30 GTA mayors and regional chairs to deal with issues 
related to regional economic recovery. The sentiment behind the partnership echoed that of the 
GTA-EDP - GTA municipalities should begin to work together and pool resources for regional 
competitiveness rather than competing with one another. This group has met on a semi-annual 
basis and in various forms since 1992. In many ways the GTA-EDP was the informal precursor 
to the marketing alliance that was eventually established in 1997. The simultaneous creation of 
the GTA-MCC provided the political support for institutionalizing collaboration in economic 
development in the form of the GTMA.  
Despite these positive factors that clearly contributed to the emergence of intermunicipal 
cooperation for regional economic development in the Toronto region others are undermining the 
strength of the partnership. Most notably, factors associated with executive and institutional 
autonomy, power asymmetry and the legacy of government intervention have negatively 
influenced attitudes of local actors towards regional collaboration. 15 
 
Institutional restructuring initiated by the provincial government in 1965 created a second tier of 
regional municipalities around the metropolitan core (then Metropolitan Toronto) and was a 
significant watershed in the evolution of intermunicipal relations. While it had the effect of 
reducing the number of actors involved in regional governance it also dramatically shifted the 
balance of interests in the region. This occurred as urbanizing „edge‟ cities that bordered Metro 
were bundled into regional governments containing primarily rural municipalities and townships. 
The result is that these edge cities were reoriented under a different set of institutions and 
incentives. This division became even more acute as Metro amalgamated to become the current 
(mega) City of Toronto in 1998 and surrounding municipalities consolidated their identities as 
suburban upper-tier metro regions. This divide, stimulated by the institutional intervention of the 
provincial government is fundamental to the identity of the region and has proven difficult to 
overcome. These have been further exacerbated by the actions of leaders in the region and their 
campaigns to increase local resources and autonomy. 
Canadian cities are overly dependent on property taxes to finance local expenditures. Property 
and related taxes typically make up half of municipal budgets – the Canadian average is 52% 
(McMillan, 2004, 51). Although competition on property tax rates will be a perpetual irritant in 
the region, it is no longer a serious barrier to intermunicipal cooperation in other areas. But this 
competition makes it more difficult for local officials to consider agreements with certain 
municipalities. Recently the City of Toronto obtained new taxing powers as a result of a 
campaign led by the mayor to increase the fiscal and jurisdictional autonomy of the central city. 
While the impact of these powers on cooperation has so far been negligible, these recent 
developments have reinforced existing divisions in the region based on power dynamics. The 
central City of Toronto is more economically and politically powerful and is treated differently than the 16 
 
surrounding municipalities. Even more significant is that the City of Toronto actively perpetuates its 
„difference‟ from surrounding municipalities. Toronto‟s crusade to secure more fiscal and jurisdictional 
autonomy and a „seat at the table‟ in federal and provincial policy is yet another example of this attitude. 
This campaign, a “New Deal”, for more autonomy and power has been overwhelmingly Toronto-centric. 
Its proponents contend that the City of Toronto is entitled to more powers and fiscal resources because it 
is so different from the other cities in the province and the region. Accentuating these differences has 
distanced the city from its neighbours and, arguably, emphasised the local agenda at the expense of a 
regional approach.  
In the Frankfurt case only government intervention had a direct influence on the emergence of 
cooperation. Whereas factors such existing regional governance structures, resource dependence 
and perceptions of power asymmetry caused observable difficulties to the emergence and 
intensification of these partnerships. 
The regional marketing partnership was created as a result of state legislation that reorganized 
the two-tier planning structure at the centre of the region. This legislation – the 
Ballungsramgesetz, 2001 – mandated the creation of regional associations within the planning 
region in several policy areas. While creation of the partnership was mandated its scale beyond 
the planning core (participation) and its institutional form were left unspecified. The absence of 
prior cooperation between the municipalities of the region, even in the central core, suggests that 
regional marketing activities would not have emerged absent government intervention. But the 
eventual structure of the organization is a function of independent intermunicipal negotiation. On 
Table 2 the influence of executive authority is listed as both positive and negative. This is 
because, on different occasions, executives in the region have both blocked and stimulated 
cooperation. Most notably, the former mayor of the city of Darmstadt opposed participation in 17 
 
the regional marketing association (they have since joined under new leadership). However, on 
other occasions mayors in the region have been very active in promoting a regional agenda by 
orchestrating regional conferences to discuss collective issues – marketing among them. While 
these conferences never led to formal cooperation between municipalities on regional marketing 
their informal activities may have helped to more deeply institutionalize the FRM GmbH. 
The history of regional governance in Frankfurt has been, unusually, a barrier to cooperation to 
the extent that it has tended to reinforce and formalize asymmetries between city, suburban and 
rural communities. It has been difficult to secure the participation of municipalities beyond the 
boundaries of the central planning area, which comprises only a fraction of the broader city-
region. One of the barrier issues identified by several suburban and rural communities relates to 
the balance of power between city and suburb/rural community. Rural and less urbanized 
communities often fail to see the benefit of cooperation and are extremely wary that their 
interests will be subsumed by those of the central city/cities. With the expansion of regional 
governance this concern has intensified as the previously divided central cities have been united 
in the planning region and can potentially better coordinate their efforts through its structures of 
the planning association and the regional council (confidential interview, October 2006). 
Coordination within the planning region has nevertheless been difficult. Part of the problem is 
that different parties have tended to hold majorities in the planning association and the regional 
council. In addition, where the planning association gives proportionally more votes (and, by 
consequence, power) to the central city of Frankfurt, the balance between central urban, 
suburban, and rural municipalities in the regional council is far more evenly distributed. In this 
context, the surrounding municipalities outnumber the central cities, which can cause further 
fragmentation within the council (Blatter, 2005; Falger, 2001). Power asymmetries also stem 18 
 
from the fragmentation of political influence between the largest cities in the region, Frankfurt, 
Wiesbaden, Darmstadt, and Mainz. These cities have long been major competing centres of 
political and economic power (Freytag et al. 2006) as central city, Hessen state capital, southern 
state planning authority capital, and state capital of Rheinland-Pfalz, respectively. This 
distribution of political power, at least between the four largest cities, has affected cooperation in 
several ways. Most obvious has been the exemption of all but Frankfurt from the 2001 
legislation. However influential the other four cities are in their own rights, there is a nearly 
universal perception of those interviewed that any partnership with Frankfurt will result in 
complete domination of central over peripheral city interests. The influence of these identities 
and asymmetries have are felt in the tensions that have manifested themselves broadly across the 
region. The resistance of Wiesbaden (and previously, Darmstadt) to participation in the 
marketing association is an indication of this wariness. Certainly, in modern times these 
divisions have been overcome on numerous occasions. But the impact of the past and the 
perceptions of power dynamics continue to affect attitudes about regional cooperation.  
The Waterloo and Rhein-Neckar regions have stronger and better supported regional marketing 
partnerships, but not necessarily because they have more conducive institutional arrangements. 
While the Waterloo case has fewer negative influences on cooperation, unlike the rest of the 
cases there are no positive systemic or intervening variables either. 
The only significant negative influences on regional cooperation – that has regardless had very 
little influence on the strength of the marketing partnership – are related to an asymmetry of 
power between municipalities based on socioeconomic differences and to concerns about local 
autonomy. While relations between the municipalities are generally harmonious the city of 19 
 
Cambridge has always remained a little apart from the other central municipalities of Kitchener 
and Waterloo. This is partly the legacy of historical economic and social differences between the 
communities. Cambridge is physically separated from the other two by Highway 401. This 
physical separation has tended to manifest itself in political distance as well. Cambridge is also 
culturally divided from Kitchener and Waterloo. The two municipalities on the north side of the 
highway have German cultural roots, whereas Cambridge
 has British origins. The municipality 
of Waterloo with its high tech economy, world renowned university (the University of 
Waterloo), upper-middle class population and international cache dominates the region while 
Cambridge is a blue-collar manufacturing center. Perhaps even more significant than these 
economic and social differences is wariness about a loss of local autonomy. The city of 
Cambridge was created when three municipalities (Galt, Hespeler and Preston) were 
amalgamated in 1973. Ever since, Cambridge has been wary of being forcibly incorporated more 
formally into the Waterloo region. While this hasn‟t prevented it from participating in regional 
partnerships, it is widely acknowledged that they are more cautious about sacrificing local 
autonomy to regional collaboration than the other central municipalities. Most significantly, 
despite the two negative influences on cooperation, and no positive ones, among the systemic 
and intervening factors, regional partnerships in Waterloo are among the strongest of all the 
cases.  
Cooperation in the regional marketing partnership in the Rhein-Neckar region is primarily the 
product of efforts by local actors to construct a broader regional partnership. The MRN GmbH, 
founded in 2006, is the marketing arm of the Rhein-Neckar metropolitan region – a partnership 
between local governments and private sector actors to coordinate economic development in the 
region. This governance structure grew out of parallel movements by different local actors to 20 
 
reform regional planning structures and to establish the region as one of Germany‟s “European 
Metropolitan Regions” in an effort to gain greater international visibility. But the tradition of 
intermunicipal cooperation that spawned these locally-generated efforts (as opposed to the 
politically-imposed regional reforms in the three other cases) has deep historical roots. Formal 
regional (political) cooperation is widely acknowledged to have started in 1951 with the 
establishment of an intermunicipal working group (the KAG). This group was established largely 
under the leadership of one man, Hermann Heimerich (former mayor of Mannheim) and became 
the first cross-border regional association in Germany. Its membership included the cities of 
Heidelberg, Ludwigshafen, and Mannheim, as well as the counties of Ludwigshafen and 
Mannheim. Its mandate for intercommunal coordination was relatively expansive but as state 
policy experts predicted, the association proved inadequate to deal effectively with regional 
problems and intermunicipal rivalries within the legal form of a GmbH (Schmitz, 2005). In 1970 
a regional planning association was created that subsequently established the regional marketing 
association that was later reformed into the MRN GmbH in the Rhein-Neckar Metropolitan 
Region reforms of 2005.  
What resulted from these appeals for reform is one of the most innovative and unique systems of 
regional governance in Europe today. The Rhein-Neckar Metropolitan Region was established in 
2005 and resulted not only from rethinking the unwieldy political structure of the previous 
planning region, but also a new approach to who should be involved in governing, and how 
regional activities should be funded. This new structure integrates political, private, 
education/knowledge and not-for-profit actors formally into the governing process. It is also 
largely funded from non-governmental sources and allows for leadership and proposals for 
regional projects to come from any of the participating sectors of society. The metro region is 21 
 
among the most widely inclusive formal regional governance structures and has come to be 
regarded as an example of „best practices‟ to other European Metropolitan regions (Priebs, 
2006). In short, this model is likely as close to the principle of associational governance as is 
possible in a genuinely regional governance structure. 
Given its integration into highly participative and innovative regional governance structures it is 
not surprising that the MRN GmbH is one of the most intense partnerships in this study. It may 
be tempting to attribute its strength entirely to this long history of regional cooperation – 
certainly past partnerships have played a role – but it would be a mistake to therefore 
characterize the region as one lacking conflict or tension. As in the Frankfurt region, the 
polycentric character and the problem of fragmented identities have contributed to conflicts 
between the three main cities, between the cities and peripheries that have rapidly become more 
urbanized and industrialized. Yet these have not prevented institutions of regional governance 
from emerging and enjoying broad support.  
In each case intermunicipal cooperation in some form has occurred despite the difficulties posed 
by systemic and intevening factors. Each region still experiences tensions and conflict, no matter 
how strong their regional partnerships. The difference between these cases is not which 
intermunicipal tensions and competition exists, but the degree to which day-to-day friction and 
insecurities spill over into intermunicipal relations in other areas. Table 2 reflects how different 
areas of opportunity and tension impact cooperation in the realm of regional marketing. The 
relevant factors, and their directions of influence, vary even within regions across different issue 
areas. The same table presenting results for influences on cooperation in transportation and on 
cultural collaboration in each of these regions is slightly different. This lack of consistency 22 
 
further highlights the difficulty of relying on systemic and intervening explanations of regional 
cooperation. Not only are the relevant factors and their directions of influence difficult to foresee 
from region to region, but these findings indicate that it is also problematic to discuss 
intermunicipal cooperation, and by extension the dynamics of regional govenrance, in the 
abstract or without reference to a specific policy or issue area. This is not to discredit the 
explanatory value of the elements of this framework or of these approaches. The preceding 
analysis demonstrates that systemic and intervening factors are vital to our understanding of the 
dynamics of intermunicipal cooperative relationships. However, on their own these do not 
constitute an effective theoretical framework. Something else must better explain these patterns. 
Envisioning the region: Civic capital and the strength of intermunicipal partnerships 
Civic capital provides an alternative explanation for regional differences in patterns of 
cooperation. It is based on the idea that civic engagement at the regional scale – even in 
unrelated and non-political areas – can increase the necessity and legitimacy of municipal 
engagement at that scale. The decision to engage in intermunicipal cooperation - whatever its 
form - is based on the political will of local governments. This framework acknowledges that can 
be shaped by many factors, and so does not dismiss the influence of systemic variables. 
However, the willingness to engage regional policy may be more closely tied to the strength of 
the regional idea.  
Civic capital is the embodiment of this concept. It has been used in a variety of contexts to refer 
to the civic resources cities can leverage to make broad-minded decisions that will benefit their 
citizens (Wagner III, 2004, see also  Potapchuk and Crocker Jr., 1999). In this paper civic capital 
is defined as a set of relations that emerges from interorganizational networks tied to a specific 
region or locality and contributes to the development of a common sense of community based on 23 
 
a shared identity, set of goals and expectations (Nelles, 2009). Simply stated, it is civic 
engagement at the regional scale, the outcome of which is collaborative governance. Note that in 
this definition collaborative governance is not necessarily politically-driven governance. Rather, 
broader and often non-political community action at the city-region scale can both directly and 
indirectly influence the intensity of cooperative partnerships between local governments.
iii 
This variant of civic capital consists of networks, leadership and scale, all of which render it 
distinctive from related social capital, civic culture, policy network and regime theory 
approaches. Civic capital is not a network but it emerges from and requires networks in order to 
function as a city-regional asset. Networks include formalized associations and informal 
interpersonal networks operating at any scale within the region – these are often substantively 
unrelated and can even be competitive. These are the „raw material‟ of civic capital that exists 
and can be activated for regional civic engagement. Leadership is a crucial dimension of civic 
capital in forging links between networks and in promoting regional scalar orientation. These 
leaders, or civic entrepreneurs, play a role in building bridges between different members of the 
communities, actors and networks to create more formalized networks of shared identities and 
interests. Leadership adds the element of agency that is largely missing from alternative 
approaches and acknowledges a role for individual or organizational actors in catalyzing regional 
engagement and, therefore, potentially contributing to collaborative governance. Finally, the 
scalar orientation of leaders and networks is critical to the concept of civic capital. While the 
precise boundaries of the region vary by issue the key orientation of civic capital is towards an 
„economic community‟ – a supra-local functional space of engagement. This builds on the idea 
that networks function at different scales, but it is not until they are oriented towards a regional 
space that they are „active‟ players in regional civic engagement.  24 
 
Both of the approaches discussed here engage networks to different degrees in their analyses. 
Rational choice theorists accord a role for policy networks as the foundation of iterated 
interactions and support for cooperative relationships. The regional governance literature, by 
contrast, focuses on the impact of social networks. However, networks are rarely central to either 
approach, and tend to be concentrated on iterated dyadic contact or social network analysis. The 
concept of civic capital builds on and develops the underlying idea behind this acknowledgement 
of a role for networks in building partnerships. Namely, that collaborative governance outside 
the public sector can impact the propensity of local authorities to cooperate and shapes the 
capacity of these partnerships to govern at the city-region scale.  
Civic capital can influence the development and form of intermunicipal partnerships directly or 
indirectly. Civic associations and groups operating at the regional scale can lobby or otherwise 
pressure local governments to become regionally active to address issues relevant to them that 
transcend local boundaries or that require intermunicipal coordination. Indirectly, increasing 
amounts of activity at the regional scale may necessitate municipal engagement at this scale in 
order to address issues at the local level. In both cases, the more widespread civic engagement is 
at the regional scale, the more necessary and legitimate the idea of regional collaboration may 
become for local actors. As the potential of regional collaboration becomes more obvious it may 
be easier for municipalities to overcome the persistent frictions associated with metropolitan 
fragmentation (whatever their sources) for collective ends. 
The results of a comparison of civic capital and intensity of intermunicipal cooperation the four 
cases were consistent with this hypothesis. The Waterloo and Rhein-Neckar regions, home to the 
most intense partnerships in the study, were also characterized by greater civic capital. The 25 
 
Toronto and Frankfurt cases, by contrast, exhibited relatively weak civic capital and weak 
partnerships across all types of regional cooperation studied. These results are presented and 
discussed in more detail in a recent paper (Nelles, 2010). One weakness of this approach is that 
while it appears to be effective in explaining differences between regions it cannot account for 
within-region variation in cooperative intensity across issue areas. However, regions with 
stronger civic capital will tend to have more intense intermunicipal partnerships than those in 
which civic engagement is weaker  Further research is necessary both to confirm the broader 
validity the observed correlation between civic capital and cooperative intensity and further 
consider how cooperation varies by issue area. (see Nelles, 2009a for some preliminary analysis 
of this question).  
Conclusion 
Cooperation is a fundamental part of governing at any level of analysis. Given the persistence of 
jurisdiction-spanning policy issues understanding intergovernmental relationships has become 
even more important to the analysis of policy processes and outcomes. This paper investigates 
the dynamics of one type of intergovernmental relationship – intermunicipal cooperation –  in an 
effort to contribute to scholarship on regional governance and to push the boundaries of 
theoretical work on intergovernmental cooperation.  
This analysis constructed and tested a theoretical framework of intermunicipal cooperation based 
on the two dominant streams of research on regional governance and interjurisdictional 
contracting. Uniting the core elements of these two complementary approaches should produce a 
more robust explanatory framework. However, both the theoretical implications of the core 
variables and the empirical findings indicate that this united approach lacks consistency in 26 
 
explaining patterns and characteristics of intermunicipal cooperation. The systemic and 
intevening factors proposed by the rational choice and governance approaches are critical to 
understanding the context within which cooperation emerges and is sustained within specific 
regions. However, the direction of influence and the strength of partnership cannot be accurately 
read from institutional factors and intervening events alone. The experiences of the Toronto and 
Waterloo regions in Canada, and the Frankfurt and Rhein-Neckar regions in Germany in 
establishing intermunicipal cooperation in the area of regional marketing support this conclusion. 
The civic capital approach acknowledges that the political will of municipalities to cooperate for 
regional development can be shaped by many factors, and so does not dismiss the influence of 
systemic and intervening variables. However, it argues that the degree of civic engagement at the 
regional scale has a more consistent influence on the intensity of intermunicipal cooperation. 
This perspective is born out by the empirical cases in this study (further elaborated in Nelles, 
2010). 
These findings have some significant implications for the study of regional governance and 
intermunicipal relations as well as broader literature on intergovernmental relationships. First, 
the comparative test of dominant theoretical approaches reveals what single cases do not – that 
most variables have the potential to contribute positively or negatively to cooperation. This paper 
attempts to fill the gap in scholarship on regional governance and development  identified by 
Pierre (2005) and Christopherson (2010) by testing theory using cross-national comparative 
analysis. Aside from the core thesis this paper also yielded insights about the nature of regional 
governance that are relevant to the future theoretical development of the field. The finding that 
the intensities of partnerships – in other words, the character of governance – varies from issue 
to issue suggests that in fragmented city-regions regional governance cannot be treated 27 
 
monolithically. In the absence of a single multi-purpose regional governance structure the 
character of intermunicipal relationships may vary across the range of regional partnerships. 
Consequently, discussing the character of governance in a city-region without reference to 
specific partnerships is problematic. Where transportation cooperation may be highly 
institutionalized cooperation on environmental management may not be as strongly supported. 
This creates a strong argument for precision in future scholarship dealing with regional 
governance and presents a challenge in selecting cases for subsequent comparative analysis.  
The conclusions of this paper also carry implications for research into intergovernmental 
relations, particularly at scales of engagement between formal levels of government. First, they 
suggest that institutional and intervening variables, while salient, are not enough to explain 
intergovernmental relations. Secondly, characterizing city-regions as policy actors – where 
partnerships behave as political entities – raises an interesting set of questions about how 
regional partnerships interface with multilevel policy making processes (see Marks & Hooghe, 
2004). On numerous occasions scholarship has referred to city-regions as important political 
actors. For instance, Scott, Agnew, Soja & Storper  (2001, 11) argue that city-regions 
"increasingly function as essential spatial nodes of the global economy and as distinctive 
political actors on the world stage" (emphasis added). Christapherson (2010) notes that regions 
are often characterized as autonomous actors in competitive games. A previously noted, it is 
problematic to refer to fragmented regions as actors without reference to a specific issue area or 
partnership. A region, left undefined in this way, cannot be considered an actor at all. It is a 
collection of authorities, individuals, networks and entities with no one single will or purpose. 
Even when discussing a specific partnership the extent to which a region can be characterized as 
a distinctive, much less significant, actor on the world stage varies significantly. Nelles (2009b) 28 
 
argues that the capacity of city-regions to function as political actors outside of their realm of 
influence depends largely on the strength of intermunicipal partnerships at the regional scale. She 
contends that the stronger horizontal partnerships are the more likely a city-region (defined in 
terms of its partnership(s)) will be able to participate in and affect political decisions made in 
senior levels of government. The role of city-regions in multilevel governance is conditioned by 
the intensity of regional partnerships. As such, the dynamics of horizontal cooperation are crucial 
to understanding the influence and behaviour of actors in multilevel governance. 
The question of how local governments cooperate for collective ends stands at the intersection of 
a number of theoretical approaches and empirical puzzles. As a result, research in this area has 
the potential to make important contributions to scholarship on regional governance and beyond. 
Future research should concentrate on testing and elaborating the impact of civic capital and 
investigating the vertical influence of these horizontal relationships. Through continued 
comparative work more can be learned about how and why we cooperate, even in competitive 
contexts, and how what we can do to encourage the sentiment of all for one. 
Appendix 1: 
Cooperative intensity is a measure of the strength of commitment of parties to a partnership. The 
strength of intermunicipal partnerships was evaluated using three different criteria: participation, 
institutionalization, and attitudes. A numerical value was assigned to each case based on a 
combination of participation and institutionalization scores.  
Participation reflects the breadth of buy-in into the partnerships. It was determined as a fraction 
of the number of actual participants divided by the number of potential participants based on 
total number of actors within the statistically defined city-region: Toronto (1.0), Frankfurt (0.25), 
Waterloo (1.0), Rhein-Neckar (1.0). 
Institutionalization refers to the degree of authority and resources sacrificed by each party to collective 
control in the interest of long term integration. It is the degree to which the partnership itself has gained 
autonomy from the participating members (Perkmann, 2003; 2004). This is also related to the degree to 
which the partnership includes non-political actors, and in what capacity. From this perspective ad hoc 29 
 
cooperation is much less institutionalized than partnerships that create an independent association. The 
types of cooperation are ranked and scored from weakest to strongest: no cooperation (0), ad hoc 
cooperation (1), informal coordination (2), public control (3), public majority (4), consensus decision 
making (5), non-political majority (6), and non-political control. See Nelles (2009) and Perkmann (2003), 
for further elaboration of this methodology. The cases are scored: Toronto (5), Frankfurt (4), Waterloo 
(6), Rhein-Neckar (7). 
Attitudes are discussed in the main text. These were evaluated based on the comments of 
interview subjects and supportive or undermining behaviour by any of the actos (i.e. duplication 
of partnership functions at the local level). The Toronto and Frankfurt cases were characterized 
by cynical attitudes (-), and the Waterloo and Rhein-Neckar regions by positive attitudes (+). 
These evaluations diminish or aument the combined score, respectively. 
Final cooperative intensities for each case: Frankfurt 4.23 (-), Toronto 6.0 (-), Waterloo 7.0 (+), 
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i Although definitions continue to be debated, a city-region (or metropolitan region) is a continuous network of urban 
communities and area of “economic energy” (Jacobs, 1969: 45). It is defined principally in terms of a densely urbanized 
core surrounded by a territory linked to that center “more than to the core of any adjacent city-region” (Parr, 2005). 
ii A more detailed description of how cooperative intensity was classified is included in Appendix 1. 
iii Does arguing that civic capital is a key determinant of cooperative intensity amount to saying that the degree of 
cooperation in a region determines the degree of cooperation between municipalities (i.e. the argument proves itself)? 
While on the surface it seems as though it does, this is a mischaracterization of the concept of civic capital. Civic capital 
consists of networks of interaction, not cooperation. While there certainly can be cooperation within and between regional 
networks, civic capital is not necessarily cooperative. Indeed, interactions can occur on many levels and be competitive or 
even conflictual (to a degree). The point is that civic capital emerges as an unintended consequence of self-serving actions 
that involve interaction between individuals or groups within a community. It is the extent to which connections are being 
forged and then these typically loose and informal networks can be harnessed or leveraged by civic entrepreneurs to 
mobilize support for collaborative solutions that underpins this central argument.  B.P. 48
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